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Abstract 
How did a health crisis translate to an economic crisis? Why did the spread of the coronavirus 
bring the global economy to its knees? The answer lies in two methods by which coronavirus 
stifled economic activities. First, the spread of the virus encouraged social distancing which led to 
the shutdown of financial markets, corporate offices, businesses and events. Second, the 
exponential rate at which the virus was spreading, and the heightened uncertainty about how bad 
the situation could get, led to flight to safety in consumption and investment among consumers, 
investors and international trade partners. We focus on the period from the start of 2020 through 
March when the coronavirus began spreading into other countries and markets. We draw on real-
world observations in assessing the restrictive measures, monetary policy measures, fiscal policy 
measures and the public health measures that were adopted during the period. We empirically 
examine the impact of social distancing policies on economic activities and stock market indices. 
The findings reveal that the increasing number of lockdown days, monetary policy decisions and 
international travel restrictions severely affected the level of economic activities and the closing, 
opening, lowest and highest stock price of major stock market indices. In contrast, the imposed 
restriction on internal movement and higher fiscal policy spending had a positive impact on the 
level of economic activities, although the increasing number of confirmed coronavirus cases did 
not have a significant effect on the level of economic activities. 
JEL classification: G21, G28, I11, I18  
Keywords: Covid-19, Coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2, outbreak, social distancing, pandemic, 
financial crisis, global recession, public health, spillovers, monetary policy, fiscal policy, liquidity 
provision, Central banks. 
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1. Introduction 
In 2019, there was anxiety about the impact of a US-China trade war, the US presidential elections 
and Brexit on the World Economy. On account of these, the IMF had predicted moderated global 
growth of 3.4 percent. But COVID-19 – the disease caused by SARS-CoV-2, a novel strain of 
coronavirus from the SARS species – changed the outlook unexpectedly. Due to fear and 
uncertainty, and to rational assessment that firms’ profits are likely to be lower due to the impact 
of COVID-19, global stock markets erased about US$6 trillion in wealth in one week from 24th 
to 28th of February. The S&P 500 index lost over $5 trillion in value in the same week in the US 
while the S&P 500’s largest 10 companies experienced a combined loss of over $1.4 trillion,1 
although some of these were recovered in the subsequent week. Some of the loss in value was due 
to rational assessment by investors that firms’ profits would decline due to the impact of the 
coronavirus. 
The International Air Transportation Association (IATA) stated that the air travel industry would 
lose US$113 billion if the COVID-19 outbreak was not quickly contained2. The IMF downgraded 
its growth projection for the global economy as the COVID-19 outbreak threw its earlier projection 
into serious doubt. The tourism industry was affected as the travel opportunities for Chinese 
tourists, who usually spend billions annually, were severely curtailed. There were increased flight 
cancellations, cancelled hotel bookings and cancelled local and international events worth over 
$200billion. The flow of goods through global supply chains vastly reduced significantly given 
that China was the world’s largest manufacturer and exporter, and the Chinese government ordered 
the closure of major factories in the country. Countries like Iran, Italy and France issued stay-at-
home nationwide policies to control the spread of the virus, which had already caused multiple 
deaths and was putting pressure on the national public healthcare infrastructure. Such stay-at-home 
policies planted the seeds of recession in developed countries, and there was a general consensus 
among economists that the coronavirus pandemic would plunged the world into a global recession 
(Financial Times, 2020).3 The International Monetary Fund in March stated that it expected a 
                                                          
1 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-stocks-carnage/coronavirus-then-oil-collapse-erase-5-
trillion-from-u-s-stocks-idUSKBN20W2TJ 
2 IATA: https://airlines.iata.org/news/potential-for-revenue-losses-of-113bn-due-to-covid-19-
%E2%80%9Ccrisis%E2%80%9D 
3 Financial Times: Global recession already here, say top economists. https://www.ft.com/content/be732afe-6526-
11ea-a6cd-df28cc3c6a68 
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global recession that would be at least as bad as the 2007-8 global financial crisis followed by a 
recovery in 2021. (Georgieva, 2020)4.  
The literature on the cause of recessions is vast (see Jagannathan et al, 2013; Stiglitz, 2010; Gaiotti, 
2013; Bezemer, 2011; Mian and Sufi, 2010; Bentolila et al, 2018; Bagliano and Morana, 2012). 
But the cause of the 2020 global recession was novel in modern history. The coronavirus triggered 
a new type of recession that was different from the past triggers of a recession. For instance, the 
Asian debt crisis of 1997 was caused by the collapse of the Thai baht in July 1997, which created 
panic that caused a region-wide financial crisis and economic recession in Asia (Radelet and Sachs, 
1998). The 2008 global financial crisis, which translated to a recession, was caused by loose 
monetary policy which created a bubble, followed by subprime mortgages, weak regulatory 
structures, and high leverage in the banking sector (Allen and Carletti, 2010). The 2016 recession 
in Nigeria was caused by the fall in the price of crude oil, balance of payment deficit, adoption of 
a fixed-float exchange rate regime, an increase in the pump price of petrol, activities of pipeline 
vandals and infrastructure weaknesses. The 2010 recession in Greece was caused by the after-
effect of the global financial crisis, structural weaknesses in the Greek economy, and lack of 
monetary policy flexibility as a member of the Eurozone (Rady, 2012).  
In this paper, we show how the coronavirus outbreak led to spillovers into major sectors of the 
global economy, and how fast policy response by several governments either triggered and 
prolonged the recession while trying to save the lives of citizens. We also investigate the effect of 
social distancing policies on the level of economic activities and stock index prices. 
The discussion in this paper contributes to the financial crisis literature (Allen and Carletti, 2010; 
Jagannathan et al, 2013; Mian and Sufi, 2010; Stiglitz, 2010; Ozili, 2020). This paper contributes 
to the literature by showing that non-financial factors and/or non-economic factors can trigger both 
a financial and economic meltdown in unprecedented ways. The implication for financial stability 
is that future stress testing of the resilience of the financial system should take into account human 
health factors as an important element in their stress testing exercises.  
                                                          
4 Fortune: https://fortune.com/2020/03/23/coronavirus-economic-impact-predictions-great-recession-2020-
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The rest of the paper is structured in the following way. Section 2 discusses the global spillovers. 
Section 3 shows the various fast policy responses adopted in several countries. Section 4 criticizes 
some of the policies. Section 5 empirically analyse the impact of social distancing policy on 
economic activities. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Spread of COVID-19 (already known as coronavirus)  
Real-time data on the spread of the coronavirus (or covid-19 disease) was collected from 
Worldometer. The data shows that the US had the highest number of infected individuals, followed 
by China, Italy and Iran as at 23rd of April 2020. The statistics is reported in Table 1. 
Table 1: COVID-19 statistics  (as at 23rd April 2020) 
Countries Confirmed cases 
(Total) 
Confirmed Deaths 
(Total) 
Recovered 
(Total) 
Global 2,656,391 185,156 729,815 
US 849,092 47,681 84,050 
Italy 187,327 25,085 54,543 
China 82,798 4,632 77,207 
Iran 87,026 5,481 64,477 
Spain 213,024 22,157 89,250 
Germany 150,729 5,315 103,300 
UK 133,495 18,000 - 
Canada 40,190 1,974 13,986 
France 159,877 21,340 40,657 
India 21,797 681 4,376 
South Korea 10,702 240 8,411 
Turkey 98,674 2,376 16,477 
Russia 62,773 555 4,891 
Brazil 46,182 2,924 25,318 
South Africa 3,635 65 1,055 
Nigeria 873 28 197 
Tunisia 909 38 190 
Source: Worldometer.5 Note that there may be unconfirmed cases which were never 
reported to the public health authorities. 
 
 
                                                          
5 https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/#countries 
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Regional data on the spread of the coronavirus (or covid-19 disease) which was reported by the 
World Health Organisation show that Europe had the highest number of infected cases, followed 
by the region of the Americas, and the Eastern Mediterranean as at 23rd of April 2020. The statistics 
is reported in Table 2. 
Table 2: World Region Situation in Numbers as of 23rd April 2020 
Region Confirmed cases New cases Total Deaths New deaths 
Global 2,471,136 73,920 169,006 6,058 
European region 1,219,486 32,302 109,952 3,618 
Region of the Americas 925,291 32,172 44,775 2,089 
Eastern Mediterranean 139,349 4,879 6,326 141 
Western Pacific Region 136,271 1,765 5,793 108 
South East Asia 33,912 2,242 1,427 86 
African region 16,115 560 720 16 
Source: World Health Organisation6 
 
 
2. Global Spillover 
Initially, the perception was that the COVID-19 pandemic would be localized in China only. It 
later spread across the world through the movement of people. The economic pain became severe 
as people were asked to stay at home, and the severity was felt in various sectors of the economy 
with travel bans affecting the aviation industry, sporting event cancellations affecting the sports 
industry, the prohibition of mass gatherings affecting the events and entertainment industries 
(Horowit, 2020; Elliot, 2020).  
There are parallels between the COVID-19 crisis and the events of 2007-2008: as in 2020, many 
people in the earlier recession assumed the impacts would largely be localized (in that case based 
on an assumption that the subprime mortgage crisis would be a relatively minor problem affecting 
only the US, but ultimately affecting the global financial system) (Elliot, 2020). The sudden 
economic disruption caused by COVID-19 is not only destructive but also has spillover 
implications because it created demand and supply shocks in almost every area of human endeavor 
(El-Erian, 2020)7 
                                                          
6 https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200325-sitrep-65-covid-
19.pdf?sfvrsn=ce13061b_2 
7 Foreign Affairs: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2020-03-17/coming-coronavirus-recession 
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2.1. Spillover to the travel industry 
The coronavirus outbreak led the governments of many countries to impose restrictions on non-
essential travel to countries affected by COVID-19, indefinitely suspending tourism travel, work 
visas and immigrant visas. Some countries placed a complete travel ban on all forms of inward or 
outward travel, shutting down all airports in the country. At the height of the coronavirus 
pandemic, most airplanes flew almost empty due to mass passenger cancellations. The travel 
restrictions imposed by governments subsequently led to the reduction in the demand for all forms 
of travel which forced some airlines to temporarily suspend operations such as Air Baltic, LOT 
Polish Airlines, La Compagnie, and Scandinavian Airlines. Such travel restrictions cost the 
tourism industry alone a loss of over $200 billion globally, excluding other loss of revenue for 
tourism travel, and were forecast to cost the aviation industry a total loss of $113billion according 
to IATA.8 US airlines sought a $50bn bailout fund for the US Airline industry alone.9 The GTBA 
reported that the business travel sector would lose $820 billion in revenue due to the coronavirus 
pandemic.10 
2.2. Spillover to the hospitality industry 
Restaurant businesses have been affected during the pandemic mainly through the government-
announced ‘stay-at-home policy’ and ‘social distancing’ movement restriction imposed by the 
government in many countries. This led to rapid shutdowns in cities and states to control the spread 
of the coronavirus, which threw many restaurants and hotels across the country into sudden shock. 
Hotels across the world witnessed booking cancellations worth billions of dollars, and the hotel 
industry sought a $150bn bailout.11 Restaurant executives laid off staff as they shut down their 
businesses temporarily. Many customers stayed at home, preferring to eat cooked meals at home. 
Some restaurant executives criticized the government for imposing the stay-at-home and social 
distancing policy which destroyed many small restaurants and pub businesses in small cities. They 
argued that governments’ announcement of stay-at home policies or social distancing policies was 
                                                          
8 https://www.iata.org/en/pressroom/pr/2020-03-05-01/ 
9 https://www.wsj.com/articles/airlines-seek-up-to-50-billion-in-government-aid-amid-coronavirus-crisis-
11584378242 
10 https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2020/03/11/business/11reuters-health-coronavirus-business-travel.html 
11 https://www.axios.com/hotel-industry-150-billion-coronavirus-relief-34910e41-2402-4260-b4b9-
8f5b738db664.html 
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an indirect way of telling people not to come to the pubs, hotels and restaurants, which was a way 
of silently destroying the hospitality industry during the pandemic.12 Multiple hotels in the US, 
UK and in some European counties announced the temporary suspension of normal operations 
which puts the estimated loss of jobs to 24.3 million globally, and 3.9 million in the US alone13 
due to the decline in hotel occupancy during the pandemic period. The economic impact of the 
pandemic on the hotel industry was more severe than the 9/11 and 2008 recessions combined. 
2.3. Spillover to the sports industry 
The sports industry was severely affected during the coronavirus outbreak. In the football segment, 
major European football leagues in England and Scotland announced the immediate suspension of 
football matches for 6 weeks until 30th April. The Turkish super league was the last major 
European league to suspend its matches. In Formula One, the Monaco Grand Prix was cancelled. 
The Tokyo Summer Olympic and Paralympic games were also postponed. In the hockey segment, 
the 2020 hockey games in England was postponed. England's FIH Pro League games scheduled 
for 2nd to 3rd and 16th to 17th May were postponed. In rugby games, the Pro14 final scheduled 
for 20th June at the Cardiff City Stadium was cancelled. The major league rugby (MLR) was 
cancelled for the remainder of the 2020 season. In the baseball segment, all major baseball league 
season games were called off in Mexico and Puerto Rico. The Motorsport game in Portugal was 
postponed after the Portuguese government declared a state of emergency and suspended all 
sporting events in the country. In the snooker segment, the World snooker championship to be held 
in Sheffield from 18th April to 4th May, was postponed. In the swimming segment, the 2020 
European Aquatics Championship scheduled for 11th to 24th in Hungary was postponed until 
August. In the golf segment, the LPGA tour was rescheduled for 10th to 13th September 2020. 
The resulting loss in revenue to the sponsors and organizers of the cancelled games ran into billions 
of dollars. 
 
 
                                                          
12 https://thebristolcable.org/2020/03/bristol-coronavirus-businesses-impact-food-restaurants-pubs-government-
threw-us-under-bus/ 
13 According to the American Hotel and Lodging Association. 
 https://www.ahla.com/covid-19s-impact-hotel-industry 
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2.4. Spillover to oil-dependent countries 
2.4.1. The oil price war: a contributing factor 
Early in 2020, the price of oil fell due to the oil price war between Russia and Saudi Arabia. The 
coronavirus pandemic worsened the situation through the reduction in the demand for oil. The 
imposed travel restrictions during the pandemic, which led to a reduction in the movement of 
people and goods, resulted in a fall in demand for aviation fuel, coal and other energy products, 
which subsequently led to a fall in oil price due to low demand. The coronavirus crisis also affected 
a wide range of energy markets such as the coal, gas and renewable energy markets, but its impact 
on oil markets was more severe because it stopped the movement of people and goods, which led 
to a drastic decline in the demand for transport fuels. When Saudi Arabia later supplied excess oil 
to the world, the market was flooded with too much oil, exceeding demand during the COVID-19 
pandemic, and subsequently leading to a fall in oil price. 
2.4.2. Loss of oil revenue to oil-dependent countries 
The effect of the pandemic on oil-dependent countries was severe. The global decline in oil price 
combined with the low demand for oil products in the international market led to a significant 
shortfall in oil revenue to oil-dependent countries, which increased current account deficits and 
worsened the balance of payment position of many oil-dependent countries such as Venezuela, 
Angola and Nigeria. These countries also faced increasing pressure on their foreign exchange 
reserves, which subsequently led to the devaluation of local currencies against the dollar. Countries 
like Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa experienced a reduction in the price of petrol in the local gas 
stations. National budgets were also affected. The sustained decline in global oil price due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic meant that the current national budget became outdated for most oil-
dependent countries, and had to be revised because it did not reflect the current economic reality 
since the budget was priced at a higher oil price from 2019. Consequently, the national budget of 
some oil-dependent countries ran into massive deficits which forced some countries to either (i) 
seek foreign loan from the IMF, World Bank and other lenders to fund their budget deficits, or (ii) 
create a new budget that was priced using the current low oil price in the global market. 
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2.5. Spillover to import-dependent countries 
Many import-dependent countries were severely affected during the coronavirus pandemic. Many 
countries imported their essential commodities from major exporting countries like China, India 
and Japan, and depend largely on these countries for the consumption of essential commodities. 
The reduction in goods flowing through the global supply chain, and substantial reliance on China 
for imported goods, led to shortages of supplies to import-dependent countries as China shut down 
many of its export factories. This led to increases in the price of the remaining stock of imported 
supplies already in import-dependent country, which also triggered inflationary pressures on the 
price of basic commodities despite the general low demand for imports due to the coronavirus 
pandemic. It was difficult to find alternative imports after China’s shut-down because many 
countries had partially or fully closed their borders which stifled international trade at the time.  
2.6. Spillover to the financial sector: Banks and Fintech 
The macroeconomic slowdown led to a rise in nonperforming loans in the banking sector by 250 
basis points. Private sector banks had the highest exposure to credit risk during the outbreak.14 
Nonperforming loans arose from loans issued to small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs), 
airlines, hotels, tour operators, restaurants, retail, construction and real estate businesses. During 
the pandemic, there was a general decline in the volume of bank transactions, a decline in card 
payments and a fall in the use of ATM cash machines worldwide. This led to fewer fees collected 
by banks which negatively affected banks’ profit. FinTech businesses were also affected. Some 
FinTech businesses witnessed very low patronage by consumers leading to loss of revenue and 
profits, which negatively affected the equity investment of venture capitalists that funded existing 
and new FinTech firms. This made many venture capitalists begin to hoard new equity which led 
to the drying up of financing for some FinTech businesses. On the other hand, the lockdowns due 
to the coronavirus outbreak resulted in higher demand for some sorts of online services such as 
online shopping. 
 
 
                                                          
14 https://www.ft.com/content/153f2922-6e15-11ea-89df-41bea055720b 
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2.7. Spillover to financial markets 
The most visible outcome of the COVID-19 crisis on financial markets was the effect in the global 
stock market. Global stock markets lost $6 trillion in value over six days from 23 to 28 February, 
according to S&P Dow Jones Indices. Between February 20 and March 19, the S&P 500 index fell 
by 28% (from 3,373 to 2,409), the FTSE 250 index fell by 41.3% (from 21,866 to 12,830), and the 
Nikkei fell by 29% (from 23,479 to 16,552). In the same period, large international banks 
witnessed a plunge in their share price, for example, Citigroup’s share price fell by 49% (from 
US$78.22 to US$39.64), JP Morgan Chase’s share price fell by 38% (from US$137.49 to 
US$85.30), and Barclays’ share price fell by 52% (from £181.32 to £86.45). Although the oil price 
war, in which Russia and Saudi Arabia were driving down oil price by increasing oil production, 
played a role in the fall in stock markets indices, the subsequent fall in stock market indices in 
March was mainly due to investors’ flight to safety during the coronavirus pandemic. 
2.8. Spillover to the event industry 
Prior to 2020, the event sector contributed significantly to the economy. In 2018, for instance, 
business events hosted more than 1.5 billion participants across more than 180 countries (Oxford 
Economics)15. The events industry generated more than $1.07 trillion of direct spending, 
representing spending to plan business events, produce business events, business events-related 
travel, and direct spending by exhibitors. The industry also created 10.3 million direct jobs globally 
and generated $621.4 billion of direct GDP.16 
During the coronavirus outbreak, the events industry was hit financially by a large number of 
cancellations — exhibitions, live music shows, conference, weddings, parties, corporate events, 
brand launches, trade shows, and more. Several big events were cancelled, for instance, the E3 and 
SXSW tech events were cancelled which led to direct losses beyond $1 billion. Informa delayed 
or cancelled events worth £400m over coronavirus pandemic. The 2020 Met Gala was postponed 
indefinitely. In the US, many big event management companies that were hit financially by the 
coronavirus outbreak appealed for federal aid from the U.S. government. The event ticketing 
segment of the industry was also affected. One of the biggest global ticketing and events 
                                                          
15 https://insights.eventscouncil.org/Portals/0/OE-
EIC%20Global%20Meetings%20Significance%20%28FINAL%29%202018-11-09-2018.pdf 
16 https://eventscouncil.org/coronavirus 
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company ‘Eventbrite’  announced that the COVID-19 outbreak materially affected its business 
outlook for 2020. The effect of the increasing cancellation on Eventbrite was so bad that the company 
had to withdraw its previously published ‘positive outlook’ for the first quarter of 2020. The effect 
of the outbreak on global live events was worsened by the social distancing policy imposed by 
several governments. 
2.9. Spillover to the entertainment industry 
The global film industry incurred a $5 billion loss during the coronavirus outbreak. Several 
Hollywood movie productions were postponed indefinitely which meant goodbye to theatre and 
cinema. The International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees (IATSE) reported that an 
estimated 120,000 below-the-line entertainment industry jobs were lost due to the coronavirus 
pandemic, most of which were theatrical stage employees. The pandemic shutdown resulted in the 
loss of 120,000 jobs held by its 150,000 members, and the IATSE advocated that the entertainment 
industry should be included in the planned federal stimulus (or bailout) package. In Italy, the 
COVID-19 outbreak severely affected the entertainment industry which incurred losses estimated 
to run into the millions of euros per week: from February 23 to March 1, 2020. There were 
estimated losses of 7.3million euros in the film screening sector, 7.2million euros in the theater 
segment, 4.1million euros in the live music segment, 2.5 million euros in the dance activities 
segment and 1.8 million euros in the exhibition segment.17 In the UK18, an estimated 50,000 
industry freelancers were expected to lose their jobs as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic 
according to BECTU (Broadcasting, Entertainment, Communications and Theatre Union). 
Collectively, unemployment levels in the entertainment industry rose to unprecedented highs, and 
yet there were doubts as to whether the entertainment industry would receive part of the planned 
federal stimulus package as many lawmakers argued that the entertainment industry was not a 
main driver of the economy, and some argued that the entertainment industry does not contribute 
much to economic activities compared to the financial and manufacturing sectors. 
 
                                                          
17 https://www.statista.com/statistics/1103010/impact-of-coronavirus-covid-19-on-the-entertainment-industry-in-
italy/ 
18 https://www.theguardian.com/film/2020/mar/19/loss-of-jobs-income-film-industry-hollywood-coronavirus-
pandemic-covid-19 
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2.10. Spillover to the health sector 
In many countries, the services of public hospitals grew in high demand but the majority of the 
testing equipment were in private hospitals. China temporarily closed all hospitals in the central 
city of Wuhan, the epicenter of a coronavirus outbreak. Iran's hospitals struggled to cope with the 
coronavirus outbreak. In Spain, the Spanish government nationalized all private hospitals and 
healthcare providers as the virus was spreading very rapidly. Singapore had sufficient healthcare 
facilities and workers to cope with the growing number of COVID-19 patients,19 and private 
hospitals were inviting and accepting foreign COVID-19 patients. The Ministry of Health (MOH) 
in Singapore subsequently advised all doctors in public and private hospitals, and private specialist 
clinics, to immediately stop accepting new foreign patients who do not live in Singapore. 
The coronavirus outbreak also affected the pharmaceutical supply chain. Drug makers around the 
world relied heavily on ingredients made in Chinese factories. About 60% of the world’s active 
pharmaceutical ingredients (API) were made in China before the coronavirus outbreak, and the 
coronavirus outbreak caused severe supply problems as China shutdown majority of its factories 
including factories that produce drugs. Many pharmaceutical companies did not store up 
substantial amounts of APIs prior to the coronavirus outbreak, and as a result, some essential drugs 
were in short supply. The pharmaceutical companies that had stored up a substantial amount of 
APIs in their warehouse refused to sell them for fear of running out of supplies while others were 
willing to sell only at a very high price. The overreliance on Chinese API manufacturers posed the 
biggest risk to the global pharmaceutical industry and the COVID-19 outbreak amplified the risk 
even further.  
Health insurers were also affected. Many health insurers in the US could not cope with the 
insurance payments to hospitals and the insurers sought to be included in the planned federal relief 
stimulus package as the health sector’s economic outlook was negative. The S&P 500 Managed 
Health Care index fell to 7% in February indicating that investors felt the health care sector would 
be severely hit. Moody's rating agency downgraded the nonprofit and public healthcare sector's 
outlook from stable to negative because of the continued spread of the coronavirus disease 
(COVID-19). Moody’s reported that the health sector was likely to see fewer cash flow in 2020 
                                                          
19 https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/spore-has-sufficient-healthcare-facilities 
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compared to 2019 and falling revenue due to the cancellation of elective surgeries. The ratings 
agency also stated that even if the coronavirus outbreak could be contained, nonprofit healthcare 
companies were already facing rising expenses and widespread uncertainty. Also, investment 
bankers that invested heavily in health care pressured health care companies and medical supply 
firms to consider ways through which they can profit from the crisis by increasing prices. The 
effect of the outbreak on the health sector was the increase in the number of deaths due to the 
short supply of drugs, lack of vaccine to cure the patients, insufficient number of hospital beds 
and insufficient isolation centers to cater for the rising number of COVID-19 cases. 
2.11. Spillover to the education sector 
The coronavirus disrupted the $600 billion higher education industry.20 Educators and students 
around the world felt the ripple effect of the coronavirus as colleges and universities were 
instructed to shut down after the coronavirus was declared a public health emergency in many 
countries. There were school closures of some kind in 44 countries on four continents, including 
Africa, with hundreds of millions of students around the world facing disruptions. The outbreak 
had a more severe consequence on schools that did not have an online learning platform. Moody’s, 
a credit rating agency, downgraded the U.S. higher education outlook from ‘stable’ to ‘negative’, 
because 30% of the colleges and universities in the US already had a weak operating performance, 
and it was difficult for these colleges and universities to adapt with the financial and academic 
changes required to cope with the coronavirus outbreak. Also, UNESCO reported that the COVID-
19 outbreak disrupted the education of at least 290.5 million students worldwide.21 Public schools 
in the US were closed, Australia shut down some schools, while countries like Israel, Nigeria, 
Egypt, Italy, France, and Spain shut down all schools, and this created some form of 
unemployment for teachers. Northern Ireland’s government suspended all examinations in its 
colleges and universities. Multiple U.S. based universities that ran a study abroad program 
overseas instructed students to return home from Italy, France and Spain as the coronavirus 
outbreak became severe in those countries. On the positive side, there were suggestions that the 
coronavirus outbreak increased the importance of online education and distance learning, but the 
reality was that only a small percentage of the world’s education is taught online. For instance, in 
                                                          
20 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-19/colleges-are-going-online-because-of-the-coronavirus 
21 https://en.unesco.org/themes/education-emergencies/coronavirus-school-closures 
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the US alone, about 2.4 million undergraduates which is equivalent to 15% of the total 
undergraduate students in the US studied entirely online in the fall of 2019, according to 
Eduventures.22 This showed that, even before the outbreak, the use of online education was already 
low for some reasons, and it was unlikely that the outbreak would lead to a radical shift from 
classroom education to online education.23 Only few schools had the capacity to arrange a distance 
learning program for their students. Finally, countries like Canada, UK and US combined lost 
billions in education revenue as foreign students either quit their studies or had to return home, 
while other foreign students looked elsewhere for quick education when the travel restrictions 
prevented them from studying in Canada, UK and US during the outbreak. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
22 https://encoura.org/products-services/eduventures-research-and-advisory-services/ 
23 The fact that numbers were low does not mean that a shift to high levels is not possible following a COVID-
inspired shock. Of course, it might revert to the previous situation after campuses are reopened. But it’s also 
possible that lecturers and students will have gained a taste of online learning, and for some it will have been 
found to be effective. 
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3. Fast Policy Response 
3.1. General policy response 
The policy measures introduced by policy makers around the world to cope with the coronavirus-
induced global recession can be divided into four categories: (i) monetary measures, (ii) fiscal 
measures, (iii) public health measures, and (iv) human control measures.  
Table 3: Some fast policy response during the 2020 global recession 
 Type Fast policy response adopted by policy makers Countries 
1 Monetary policy 
measures 
Granting (i) regulatory forbearance to banks, and (ii) 
principal or interest moratorium to debtors affected by 
COVID-19 
Ireland, China, Nigeria and Italy  
Central banks’ provision of liquidity to financial (bond and 
equity) markets 
China and US  
Central banks’ purchase of bonds and securities that were 
plunging in value rapidly 
Australia, EU and Canada 
Lowering interest rates by Central banks 
 
Turkey, US, New Zealand, Japan and UK, 
Nigeria, South Korea and Canada 
Sustained flow of credit to banks, SMSEs, public health 
sector, individuals and essential businesses 
Australia, Nigeria, US and UK 
2 Fiscal measures Governments approving a large federal stimulus package for 
sectors and industries most affected by the COVID-19 
pandemic 
UK, US, Australia and Nigeria 
Provision of income support for individuals Australia, US, UK and India 
Social welfare payments to support each household Australia, US 
3 Public health 
measure 
Public quarantine 
 
India, US, UK and almost every country 
Border quarantine Poland, Vietnam, India, UK, US, Pakistan, 
Australia and Colombia 
Issuing a stay-at-home policy Italy, Iran, Nigeria and UK 
Social distancing policy 
 
South Africa, US, UK, UAE, Singapore, 
Nigeria, Japan, China, India, Germany, 
Pakistan, Australia, South Korea and Israel 
4 Human control 
measures 
Temporary release of prisoners from overcrowded prisons Iran and US 
Shut-down of air, land and sea borders  
 
Taiwan, India, Mexico, US., Germany, 
Serbia and Nigeria 
Shutdown of schools UK, Spain, Italy, South Africa, Nigeria 
and US 
Using the military to enforce a coronavirus stay-at-home 
lockdown 
Malaysia, Italy, US, Israel, South Africa 
and Spain 
Travel ban EU, US, Argentina, Austria, Australia, 
Bolivia, Cambodia, Canada, China, Cape 
Verde, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, 
Denmark, Egypt, Germany, Greece and 
Haiti 
Visa denial and suspension  South Africa, Canada, Singapore, China, 
Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Bolivia and Brazil 
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3.2. Policy response by developing (CEEMEA) countries 
Some policy response (and measures) taken by Central and Eastern Europe, Middle East and Africa 
(CEEMEA) countries as of March 24 in 2020 are shown in table 4  
Table 4: Policy Measures to Combat Spread of Coronavirus in Central and Eastern Europe, Middle East and African 
Countries 
 Foreign 
travel 
restrictions 
Internal 
travel 
restrictions 
State of 
emergency 
declared 
Limiting 
mass 
gathering 
Closing 
down of 
schools 
Restricting 
shops & 
restaurants 
Remarks 
Czech            (i) Closure of shops & restaurants to 
reopen on March 25 
Hungary           (i) State of emergency declared, 
indefinitely. 
Poland            (i) Shops have limited working hours, 
(ii) restaurants and entertainment 
venues closed until March 28 
Romania            (i) Decisions announced days after 
the new government was voted in on 
March 16 
Russia          (i) Restricted flights from and to high 
risk areas, (ii) schools closed for 3 
weeks 
Ukraine            (i) All air travel suspended, (ii) shop 
and/or local transport closure varies 
by region or city 
Egypt          (i) Partial suspension of mass 
gatherings - does not ban religious 
gatherings, but places some 
limitations on the size 
Israel            (i) Emergency measures to be 
enforced by the police, (ii) 80% of 
employees to stay at home. 
Lebanon            - 
Saudi 
Arabia 
           - 
Turkey            (i) Curfew imposed on citizens 65 
years old or older, (ii) around 10,000 
people arriving from abroad under 
quarantine 
Ghana           
Kenya           
Nigeria          (i) Closed all kinds of school, (ii) 
partial shutdown of offices. 
South 
Africa 
          (i) State of national disaster declared, 
(ii) 21-day lockdown announced on 
March 23 
India            Announced a 21-day nationwide 
lockdown 
Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research (exhibit 4) 
 
3.3. Fiscal policy measures 
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Fiscal policy measures were also announced in many countries to mitigate the negative economic 
impact of COVID-19, as shown in table 5. 
 
Table 5: Fiscal Policy Measures to Combat Spread of Coronavirus 
Countries Total Increase in 
Direct Spending 
% of GDP Fiscal Support via 
Loans and Loan 
Guarantees 
% of GDP Remarks 
US USD $484bn 2.4 USD2.3tn 9.3 Measures 
announced 
UK GBP 350bn 11.8 GBP330bn 10.7 Measures 
announced 
Canada C$ 107bn 6.2 - - Measures 
announced 
Czech CZK 100bn 1.8 CZK900bn 15.9 Measures 
announced 
Poland ZL 212bn 9 ZL700mn 0.1 - 
Romania RON 9bn 0.9 EUR 400mn 0.2 - 
Russia RUB 1.4tn 0.3 - - Measures 
announced 
Egypt EGP 50bn 0.8 EGP50bn 0.8 - 
Israel ILS 2.8bn 0.4 - -  
Saudi 
Arabia 
SR 120 billion 3.9 - - - 
Turkey 100 billion LIRA 185 - - Increased credit, 
lower taxes and 
deferred 
payments 
Nigeria NGN3.5tn 2.3 $6.9bn 7.5 Measured 
announced 
India ₹1.7 lakh crore 967 $1 billion 0.04 World bank 
loan 
Source: Media reports and Central Banks’ press release  
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3.4. Monetary policy measures 
Expansionary monetary measures were adopted by many central banks to stimulate the economy 
through interest rate adjustments, as shown in table 6 and 7. 
 
Table 6: Monetary Policy Measures Announced to Mitigate the Negative Economic Impact of COVID-19 in Central & Eastern 
Europe, Middle East and African countries 
Countries Monetary policy rate New asset 
purchases 
 
Credit and 
liquidity 
facilities 
Additional 
As of  
January 1 
Current 
rate 
End of 2nd 
Quarter 
Czech 2.00 1.75 1.00 Government 
bonds 
Increased FX 
swap stock 
- 
Hungary 0.90 0.90 0.90 - - Grace period for loans extended to firms 
under FGS scheme 
Poland 1.50 1.00 0.50 Government 
bonds 
- Decreased reserve requirement and 
increased interest rate 
Romania 2.50 2.00 1.50 Government 
bonds 
- - 
Russia 6.25 6.00 6.00 FX sales - - 
Ukraine 13.50 10.00 8.50 FX Sales - - 
Egypt 12.25 9.25 9.25 - - Measures discussed to reduce loan burden 
on firms and households 
Israel 0.25 0.25 0.10 Government 
bonds 
 - 
Saudi Arabia 2.25 1.00 - - - - 
Turkey 12.00 9.75 - - - Wide range of measures such as new credit 
facilities, reduced reserve requirements, 
etc. 
Ghana 16.00 14.50 14.50 - - Reduced primary reserve requirement and 
other ratios to release liquidity 
Kenya 8.50 7.25 - - - Reduced cash reserve ratio, extensive loan 
restructuring 
Nigeria 13.50 13.50 - - - Measures towards moving away from 
multiple FX regimes, reduced intervention 
rate, reducing federal interest rate. 
India 5.15 4.4 -  3.74 lakh 
crore liquidity 
injected 
Reduced CRR to 3%. Three-month 
moratorium on term loans outstanding. 
Total liquidity injection 3.4% of GDP 
South Africa 6.50 5.25 4.75 - - - 
Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research (exhibit 6). GS refers to Goldman Sachs. 
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Money supply measures were also adopted by many central banks through bond purchases 
programs or as direct coronavirus relief funds. Table 7 below shows the total central bank 
spending by some central banks to stimulate the economy. 
 
Table 7: Central bank spending 
S/N Central Bank Amount Covid-19 Policy response 
1 Reserve bank of India $50 billion  India adopted a ‘whatever it takes’ policy 
which suggest an uncapped spending 
2 Central bank of Russia 300-billion ruble ($4 billion) Anti-coronavirus crisis fund 
3 Bank of Canada C$1.0 billion (US$703 
million) 
Purchase of government bonds, beginning 
with purchase of C$5 billion per week 
4 ECB €750bn (£637bn) 
($796.2billion) 
Emergency fund for bond purchase program 
for EU member countries 
5 Bank of England  £ 200 billion pounds ($248 
billion) 
First round of quantitative easing. An 
additional round of QE is currently being 
considered 
6 Federal reserve more than $3 trillion  For loans and asset purchases. FED said its 
balance sheet had exceeded US$3 trillion 
7 People bank of china 500billion yuan ($79 billion) To rescue a virus-weakened economy 
8 Reserve Bank of 
South Africa 
- Fiscal authorities are taking the lead on this, 
not central bank 
9 Bank of France 45 billion euros 
($48.9billion) 
Country allocation from the ECB rescue fund 
10 Central bank of Italy 25 billion euros 
($27.2billion) 
Country allocation from the ECB rescue fund 
11 Reserve bank of 
Australia 
A$90 billion ($56 billion) Coronavirus support fund 
12 Central bank of Brazil 1.2 trillion reais ($231 
billion) 
Financial support to counter the effects of 
COVID-19 
 Total $4.541 trillion  
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4. Fast policy response: Issues 
4.1.  A difficult decision 
Policy makers in government and Central banks were faced with two major decisions, which is to: 
‘save the people before saving the economy’, or ‘save the economy before saving the people’. One 
choice had to be made because it was difficult to achieve both at the same time. You cannot save 
the people and the economy at the same time because to save the people (who are also economic 
agents) during the outbreak you have to tell them to stay at home in order to control the spread of 
coronavirus which means economic activities will have to stop or reduce significantly, which will 
trigger an economic slowdown. Policy makers in many countries felt it was better to save the 
people before saving the economy, and as a result, the economy was allowed to suffer in some 
countries.  
4.2. Contradictory and conflicting policy response 
During the coronavirus pandemic, many of the fast policy responses were insufficient even though 
the policies were formulated with good intentions. Monetary policy, for instance, helped to calm 
financial markets but it did not stop the recession. Central banks responded to the coronavirus 
outbreak by changing monetary policy variables such as lowering interest rates and increasing 
money (or credit) supply to crucial sectors of the economy. But monetary policy alone could not 
induce demand when there was a general flight to safety among consumers and investors – not 
many people were buying anything or making new investments. It became clear to many 
economists that monetary policy is not a vaccine, it cannot cure a recession. The expansionary 
monetary policies adopted in many countries during the outbreak encouraged economic activities 
but economic agents were unable to engage in economic activities because governments had 
imposed social distancing restrictions amid fear of contacting the coronavirus during the outbreak. 
The central bankers were ‘expecting’ particular outcomes and wanted to shift the needle in that 
direction as much as they could, but in reality their best efforts wouldn’t achieve all that much. 
4.3. Using broad fiscal expenditure and sector priority 
Some countries used a broad federal fiscal stimulus (or bail-out) package to mitigate the effect of 
COVID-19 on the economy during the outbreak. Determining which sectors will receive part of 
the stimulus package and which sectors will not receive the stimulus package became a political 
issue in some countries like the UK and US as it stirred up debates as to whether the government 
considered the entertainment sector, hospitality sector and the circular economy to be less 
important and insignificant to the economy and ineligible to receive some funding from the federal 
stimulus package compared to the banking sector, manufacturing, education, pharmaceutical and 
the aviation sectors which were considered to be significant contributors to the economy. Some 
members of excluded sectors protested because they felt that the government did not consider other 
sectors as significant contributors to the economy. 
4.4. Fast policy destroyed some segment of the hospitality industry very fast 
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Policies such as the ‘stay-at-home policy’ and the ‘social distancing policy’ severely damaged the 
incomes of restaurants, pub, shops and hotels in many locations, in some cases resulting in them 
closing down. It destroyed many businesses in the hospitality industry in ways that were not 
anticipated, and the government failed to take responsibility for the failure of small and large 
businesses that did not survive the coronavirus outbreak due to the government-imposed social 
distancing policy and lockdown restrictions. It was either the social distancing policy was 
implemented too early or the policy was taken to the extreme by citizens and travelers who were 
afraid to patronize such businesses for fear of contracting the COVID-19 disease.24 
 
5. Empirical analysis: impact of social distancing policies 
5.1. Data and methodology 
In this section, we empirically examine whether social distancing policies affected economic 
activities. The data collected is a one-month data from the 23rd of March to 23rd April, 2020. The 
narrow sample period allows us to capture the direct (and immediate) impact of social distancing 
policies on stock market performance and the level of general economic/business activities at the 
peak of the coronavirus crisis in March and April of 2020.  
We collected data from stock markets in four continents: North America, Africa, Asia and Europe. 
We extract stock market information on the closing price, (CP), lowest price (LP) and highest price 
(HP) from the leading stock market indicators in the four continents: the FTSE 500 index (UK), 
SP 500 (US), the Nikkei 225 (Japan) and the SA Top 40 index (South Africa). In the estimations, 
we take the natural logarithm of each price data to reduce the observed skewness in the stock price 
data distribution.  
Also, we collected data on Purchasing Managers' Index (PMI) for Japan, UK, US and South Africa 
for the month of March and April. The PMI is an index of the prevailing direction of economic 
trends in the manufacturing and service sectors. It is derived from monthly surveys of private 
sector companies. The PMI is used as a proxy for the level of general economic/business activities 
(EC). 
For the explanatory variables, we use three variables to capture social distancing policies: the 
number of lockdown days (SDL), restriction in internal movement (RIM) and international travel 
restrictions (IR). We also control for the monetary policy decisions (MP), size of fiscal policy 
spending (FP) and the number of COVID-19 confirmed cases (CC) reported in the four countries. 
We take the natural logarithm of the FP and CC variable observations to reduce the observed 
skewness in the FC and CC data distribution. Data for the RIM, IR, MP, FP and CC variables were 
                                                          
24  It’s clear that extreme isolation policies can be very effective against the coronavirus, and can give governments 
time to put in place tracking methods, which can be effective once the number of cases is small. It can also be the 
case that governments acted very robustly at a point when it looks too early damning the economic consequences 
of such policies. 
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collected from the ‘Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker (OxCGRT) database’. 
OxCGRT is a new database that monitor governments’ policy response during the outbreak. 25 The 
SDL variable was calibrated in the following way: the first day of lockdown is assigned a value 
‘1’, the second day of lockdown is assigned a value ‘2’, the fifth day of lockdown is assigned a 
value ‘5’ and so on. Finally, the data gives us a panel data.  
5.2. Model specification 
The model is a multivariate model, estimated using a least square regression, shown below.  𝐸𝐶𝑖, 𝑡 =  𝑐 +  𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝑅𝐼𝑀𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝐼𝑅𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝑀𝑃𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝐹𝑃𝑖, 𝑡 𝐶𝐶𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖, 𝑡 … … … … . 1 𝑆𝑀𝑖, 𝑡 =  𝑐 +  𝑆𝐷𝐿𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝑅𝐼𝑀𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝐼𝑅𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝑀𝑃𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝐹𝑃𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝐶𝐶𝑖, 𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖, 𝑡 … … … … . 2 
 Where, 
EC = level of general economic activities 
SM = the log vector of stock market variables: CP, ∆CP, LP and HP  
i = country 
t = business day of the week 
The descriptive statistics and correlation tables are reported in Table 9 and 10 (see appendix). 
5.3. Discussion of result 
The results are reported in Table 8. The SDL coefficient is negative and significant in column 1, 
2, 3, 4 and 5, and indicates that the number of lockdown days significantly affected the closing, 
opening, lowest and highest stock prices and the level of general economic activities (EC). The 
RIM coefficient is positive and significantly related to EC and the stock price variables. This 
indicates that the imposed restriction on internal movement had a positive effect on the level of 
economic activities and the closing, opening, lowest and highest stock price. The IR coefficient is 
negatively related to EC and all the stock price variables in columns (1) to (5). This indicates that 
the international travel restriction imposed during the coronavirus pandemic had a significant and 
negative effect on the level of economic activities as well as stock prices. The MP coefficient is 
negatively related to EC and the stock price variables in columns (1) to (5). This indicates that 
monetary policy decisions had a significant and negative effect on the level of economic activities 
and for the closing, opening, lowest and highest stock prices. The FP coefficient is positive and 
significant in all estimations, and indicates that the size of fiscal policy spending had a positive 
impact on stock prices and the level of economic activities. The CC coefficient is negative and 
insignificant, which indicates that the number of confirmed cases did not have a significant effect 
on the level of economic activities. 
                                                          
25 https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/research/research-projects/coronavirus-government-response-tracker 
  Ozili and Arun (2020) 
23 
 
 
Table 8: Impact of social distancing policy on stock markets and general business activities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Closing Price 
(CP) 
Opening price 
(OP) 
Lowest Price 
(LP) 
Highest 
Price (HP) 
EC 
SDL -0.113*** 
(-4.87) 
-0.112*** 
(-4.85) 
-0.112*** 
(-4.87) 
-0.112*** 
(-4.91) 
-0.588*** 
(-3.20) 
RIM 1.369* 
(1.90) 
1.388* 
(1.95) 
1.325* 
(1.86) 
1.430** 
(2.02) 
30.356*** 
(5.36) 
IR -0.580*** 
(-4.99) 
-0.579*** 
(-5.05) 
-0.587*** 
(-5.10) 
-0.571*** 
(-4.99) 
2.706*** 
(2.95) 
MP -1.107*** 
(-6.10) 
-1.113*** 
(-6.22) 
-1.096*** 
(-6.12) 
-1.125*** 
(-6.32) 
-11.517*** 
(-8.07) 
FP 0.0003*** 
(40.67) 
0.0003*** 
(41.2) 
0.0003*** 
(41.07) 
0.0003*** 
(41.44) 
0.001*** 
(21.68) 
CC 0.685*** 
(4.37) 
0.680*** 
(4.39) 
0.691*** 
(4.45) 
0.674*** 
(4.37) 
-1.467 
(-1.19) 
      
R2 83.47 83.87 83.96 83.84 61.47 
Adjusted R2 82.29 82.72 82.71 82.68 58.71 
Observation 76 76 76 76 76 
SDL = number of lockdown days. RIM = restriction on internal movement. IR = international 
travel restrictions. MP = monetary policy rates. FP = natural logarithm of fiscal policy spending. 
CC = natural logarithm of the number of confirmed cases. EC = level of general 
business/economic activities. CP = natural logarithm of closing stock price for each stock index. 
LP = natural logarithm of lowest stock price for each stock index. HP = natural logarithm of 
highest stock price for each stock index. OP = natural logarithm of opening stock price for each 
stock index. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. T-
statistic are reported in parenthesis 
 
5.4. Implication of the findings 
Overall, the results showed that the increasing number of lockdown days, monetary policy 
decisions and international travel restrictions imposed at the peak of the coronavirus crisis severely 
affected the level of general economic activities and the opening, lowest and highest stock prices 
of major stock market indices. On the other hand, the imposed restriction on internal movement 
and fiscal policy spending had a positive impact on the level of economic activities while the 
number of confirmed cases was positively related to the opening, highest and lowest stock prices 
of major stock indices.  The implication of the findings is that fiscal policy spending appears to be 
more effective in mitigating the effect of the covid-19 pandemic than monetary policy decisions 
particularly because the adoption of accommodative monetary policies by many central banks can 
exacerbate inflationary pressures that could worsen macroeconomic stability in the short term. 
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6. Conclusion: Don’t waste the coronavirus crisis 
We analysed the coronavirus outbreak and the spillover to the global economy which triggered the 
global recession in 2020. Policy makers in many countries were under pressure to respond to the 
coronavirus outbreak.  As a result, many governments made fast policy decisions that had far-
reaching positive and negative effects on their respective economy – many countries plunged into 
a recession. Social distancing policies and lockdown restrictions were imposed in many countries, 
and there have been arguments that such social policies can trigger a recession. Our findings in 
section 5 showed that a 30-day social distancing policy or lockdown restriction hurts the economy 
through a reduction in the level of general economic activities and through its negative effect on 
stock prices. 
Lawmakers in many countries supported an extended social distancing policy, damning the 
consequences of social distancing on the economy. The recession that followed, which many 
countries experienced, was a reflection of the difficult choice that policy makers had to make in 
choosing whether to save the economy before saving the people or to save the people before saving 
the economy; many countries chose the latter. There were criticisms that the policies were too fast, 
premature or insufficient, and that the policies contradicted one another in some areas, for instance, 
the accommodative monetary policy encouraged economic agents to engage in economic activities 
while the lockdowns and social-distancing (stay-at-home) policy prevented economic activities 
from taking place. 
On the bright side, the coronavirus-induced public health crisis created an opportunity for many 
governments to make lasting reforms in the public health sector. Countries like the UK and Spain 
repaired their public health care system, and fixed other shortcomings in public infrastructure such 
as the transition to online education, transportation systems and the disease detection systems in 
public hospitals. Some governments also used the crisis as an opportunity to fix the economic 
system and the financial system with the planned federal stimulus package. 
Our study has some limitations. The main limitation of this research paper is the short period of 
analysis due to limited dataset. A longer study period may capture the socioeconomic 
consequences of government policies during the coronavirus crisis. Also, as future events unfold, 
there could be spillovers to other sectors that we did not analyse in this study. Future studies on 
spillovers could be extended to two directions. First, future studies can examine the impact on 
government policy on the informal economy. Second, it would be important to explore how banks 
and financial institutions react to economic policy developments during the coronavirus crisis. 
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Appendix 
Table 9: Descriptive statistics 
 CP HP LP OP EC SDL RIM IR MP FP CC 
 Mean  9.3  9.3  9.2  9.2  40.9  11.5  1.8  2.01  1.2  15102  9.6 
 Median  9.2  9.2  9.2  9.19  40.0  11.5  2.0  3.0  0.1  8299.  9.2 
 Maximum  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  48.5  22.0  2.0  3.0  5.2  45580  13.6 
 Minimum  7.7  7.7  7.7  7.7  32.9  1.0  1.0  0.0 -0.1  0.0  5.6 
 Std. Dev.  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.1  5.1  6.3  0.4  1.3  2.1  1728  2.2 
 Observations  88  88  88  88  88  88  76  76  76  88  88 
SDL = number of lockdown days. RIM = restriction on internal movement. IR = international travel restrictions. MP = 
monetary policy rates. FP = natural logarithm of fiscal policy spending. CC = natural logarithm of the number of confirmed 
cases. EC = level of general business/economic activities. CP = natural logarithm of closing stock price for each stock index. 
LP = natural logarithm of lowest stock price for each stock index. HP = natural logarithm of highest stock price for each stock 
index. OP = natural logarithm of opening stock price for each stock index 
 
 
Table 10: Pearson Correlation 
            
            Variables CP HP LP OP EC SDL RIM IR MP FP CC 
CP  1.00           
 -----           
            
HP  0.99*** 1.00          
 (439.97) -----          
            
LP  0.99*** 0.99*** 1.00         
 (427.87) (462.81) -----         
            
OP  0.99*** 0.99*** 0.99*** 1.00        
 (281.49) (414.06) (518.09) -----        
            
EC  0.22** 0.22** 0.21* 0.21* 1.00       
 (1.97) (1.99) (1.90) (1.92) -----       
            
SDL  -0.16 -0.16 -0.15 -0.15 -0.72*** 1.00      
 (-1.42) (-1.42) (-1.33) (-1.37) (-9.18) -----      
            
RIM  -0.37*** -0.37*** -0.37*** -0.37*** -0.32*** 0.11 1.00     
 (-3.46) (-3.48) (-3.48) (-3.47) (-2.97) (0.94) -----     
            
IR  0.23** 0.24** 0.23** 0.23** 0.33*** -0.07 -0.18 1.00    
 (2.12) (2.12) (2.10) (2.09) (3.03) (-0.61) (-1.62) -----    
            
MP  0.70*** 0.70*** 0.70*** 0.70*** 0.09 -0.15 0.32*** 0.39*** 1.00   
 (8.53) (8.51) (8.48) (8.50) (0.81) (-1.30) (2.97) (3.65) -----   
            
FP  0.94*** 0.94*** 0.93*** 0.93*** 0.25** -0.17 -0.19* 0.48*** 0.85*** 1.00  
 (23.70) (23.84) (23.51) (23.57) (2.23) (-1.50) (-1.70) (4.73) (14.26) -----  
            
CC  -0.90*** -0.90*** -0.89*** -0.90*** -0.50*** 0.53*** 0.43*** -0.14 -0.56*** -0.81*** 1.00 
 (-18.07) (-18.15) (-17.69) (-17.86) (-4.96) (5.47) (4.17) (-1.22) (-5.87) (-12.04) ----- 
            
***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. T-statistic are reported in parenthesis 
 
